Civil Rights - Race Discrimination - Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - Res Judicata - Individual Actions Subsequent to EEOC Actions by O\u27Keefe, John R.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 19 Number 3 Article 10 
1981 
Civil Rights - Race Discrimination - Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 - Res Judicata - Individual Actions Subsequent to EEOC 
Actions 
John R. O'Keefe 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John R. O'Keefe, Civil Rights - Race Discrimination - Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - Res Judicata - 
Individual Actions Subsequent to EEOC Actions, 19 Duq. L. Rev. 589 (1981). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol19/iss3/10 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
CIVIL RIGHTS-RACE DISCRIMINATION-TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964-RES JUDICATA -INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS SUBSEQUENT TO
EEOC ACTIONS-The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit has held that dismissal for failure to comply with the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act of a Title VII employment discrimination
action brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Co mission is
res judicata as to an individual's subsequent private action based upon
the same claim.
Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1980).
In 1966, John Henry Jones, a black male, filed three employment ap-
plications with Bell Helicopter Textron (Bell Helicopter) at its Fort
Worth, Texas plant, but was granted no employment interview. Believ-
ing that he had been denied an interview and a job because of racial
discrimination, Jones filed charges with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) against Bell Helicopter alleging violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' Two years after his initial
employment applications were filed, the EEOC found reasonable cause
to process Jones' claim.2 In 1969 or 1970, the EEOC referred the com-
plaint to the Justice Department for prosecution.' The Justice Depart-
ment pursued the claim only to the point of requesting from Bell
Helicopter information pertaining to Jones' claim' Thereafter, no fur-
ther action was taken until February of 1975, when the EEOC proposed
to Bell Helicopter acceptable conditions for conciliation of Jones' com-
plaint and the complaints of twelve others., Finally, in September of
1. Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389, 1389 (5th Cir. 1980). Jones alleged
racial discrimination in hiring and employment practices in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). EEOC v. Bell Helicopter
Co., 426 F. Supp. 785, 788 (N.D. Tex. 1976). Under the enforcement provisions of Title VII,
a person alleging that an employer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice must
file a charge with the EEOC. The EEOC then serves notice of the charge on such
employer within 10 days of its filing, followed by an investigation of the charges. Such
charges are filed in writing and are submitted under oath or affirmation. 42 U.S.C. §
20O0e-5(b) (1976).
2. 614 F.2d at 1389. After Jones' claim had been filed, but before the EEOC processed
the claim, Bell Helicopter offered Jones a file clerk position on the night shift at the Fort
Worth plant. Jones rejected this offer because it was inferior to the civil service post he
then held. Id
3. Id. The EEOC did not gain authority to prosecute its own actions until 1972. See
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 103 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1976)).
4. 426 F. Supp. at 792. The last communication between the Justice Department and
Bell Helicopter was on December 15, 1970. Id.
5. 614 F.2d at 1389. Conciliation letters are sent by the EEOC to the alleged
discriminator prior to any civil action in an effort to achieve some settlement between the
Duquesne Law Review
1975, the EEOC filed suit in federal district court against Bell
Helicopter seeking redress for Jones and the twelve others.6 Jones ap-
parently was not informed of the status of his complaint until suit was
filed.7 He made no effort to intervene in the suit against Bell
Helicopter.8
On December 6, 1976, Judge Mahon, of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas, dismissed the EEOC claim
with respect to Jones' 1966 employment applications, finding an inor-
dinate delay of seven years between the determination of cause and
the issuance of conciliation letters.' The court found this unexcused
delay to be in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act."°
Although the dismissal was certified as an appealable order, no appeal
was taken by the EEOC.1'
Thereafter, Jones requested a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC,"
which was issued on April 29, 1977.'" Jones filed suit in federal district
court against Bell Helicopter on May 23, 1977, alleging discrimination
in hiring violative of Title VII." The district court dismissed Jones'
complaint, holding that the prior EEOC dismissal was res judicata on
the merits of Jones' complaint.'"
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit' 6 affirmed the district court decision, holding
that a dismissal of an EEOC employment discrimination action for
failure to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act is res
alleged discriminator and the aggrieved party by persuasion and suggestion. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
6. 426 F. Supp. at 792.
7. 614 F.2d at 1389-90.
8. Id- at 1390.
9. 426 F. Supp. at 790-93. The district court commented that the only apparent
reason for such an inordinate delay is administrative lethargy and inertia. The court fur-
ther noted the importance of keeping a defendant on notice that charges are pending and
commented that the EEOC failed even to pursue this simple procedure. Finally, the court
found that Bell Helicopter had demonstrated that it was prejudiced by the delay. Id. at
793.
10. Id. at 792-93. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 706(1), (2) (1976).
11. Brief for Appellee at 8, EEOC v. Bell Helicopter Co., 426 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Tex.
1976).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). If within 180 days from the filing of a charge
the EEOC has not filed a civil action or entered into a conciliation agreement to which the
aggrieved individual is a party, the EEOC must notify that individual of his right to sue
within 90 days after receipt of the notice that conciliation has failed. Id.
13. 614 F.2d at 1390.
14. Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., No. CA 4-77-137 (N.D. Tex., filed May 23, 1977).
15. Id.
16. Judge Wisdom wrote the opinion of the unanimous panel, which also included
Judges Johnson and Politz.
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judicata as to the individual's subsequent private action based upon
the same claim."' Relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b),' 8 the
court construed the prior dismissal of the EEOC action' 9 to operate as
an adjudication on the merits of Jones' claim, thereby precluding fur-
ther prosecution of that claim in later suits.' The court distinguished
Truvillion v. King's Daughters Hospital, in which it had allowed an in-
dividual to maintain a private action under Title VII subsequent to a
dismissal of an EEOC action on the same claim." In Truvillion the
EEOC action was dismissed because of the EEOC's failure to meet pro-
cedural prerequisites to suit.' The Supreme Court has characterized
such procedural dismissals as "jurisdictional" for the purposes of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Thus, in Truvillion, unlike in
Jones, the dismissal of the EEOC action did not reach the merits and
did not bar the individual's subsequent action."
Finally, the Jones court looked to the behavior of both the EEOC
and Jones in proceeding with the claim against Bell Helicopter., The
court found that the EEOC's inept, slothful, and indifferent behavior
was contrary to its purpose to protect substantive rights. 6 Despite the
EEOC's overwork and understaffing, the court refused to accept its
delay.' The court concluded by noting that although Jones showed a
lack of interest in pressing his claim, he did not deserve to be penalized
by the EEOC's failure to provide decent governmental process.'8
Prior to the 1972 amendment' to Title VII, the EEOC was without
17. 614 F.2d at 1391.
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) provides:
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under
this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party
under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication on the merits.
Id.
19. 426 F. Supp. at 794.
20. 614 F.2d at 1390.
21. Id at 1390. See Truvillion v. King's Daughters Hosp., 614 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1980).
22. 614 F.2d at 524. See 614 F.2d at 1390. The procedural prerequisites to suit are: (1)
notice by the EEOC to the respondent and (2) a good faith investigation by the EEOC. 614
F.2d at 524. See note 1 supra.
23. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 285 (1961). See 614 F.2d at 1390.
24. 614 F.2d at 524. See 614 F.2d at 1390.
25. 614 F.2d at 1391.
26. Id. The broad congressional purposes underlying Title VII are: (1) to eliminate
the social disaster of racial, religious, and sex discrimination in employment opportunity,
and (2) to enact prompt and effective methods to accomplish this goal. H.R. REP. No. 238,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2137, 2138, 2148.
27. 614 F.2d at 1391.
28. Id. Although the court noted that Jones did not deserve to be penalized, it never-
theless affirmed the district court judgment. See id.
29. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
1981
Duquesne Law Review
power to enforce an employee's rights. 0 Because the EEOC lacked
enforcement power its role was that of a conciliator. 1 Where concilia-
tion failed, the EEOC was forced to refer the complaint to the Justice
Department for prosecution, or the individual had to maintain a
private action against his alleged discriminator.
The 1972 amendment gave the EEOC authority to enforce its own
actions by filing civil lawsuits against the charged party.2 Because
private enforcement remedies were not rescinded,3 the potential exists
for duplicative litigation by the EEOC and the aggrieved individual to
enforce similar employment rights.
Generally, the courts have dealt with this duplication problem in
one of three ways: (1) the dismissal of duplicative actions, (2) the con-
solidation of actions, or (3) the restriction of the party bringing the sec-
ond action to intervention in the prior suit. Courts following the first
approach have reasoned that preclusion of the subsequent EEOC or
private action is necessary to prevent a duplication of proceedings.'
Some courts, however, refused to bar subsequent EEOC actions that
were broader in scope than the private action. 5 Title VII claims in-
volve the vindication of a major public interest.' Thus, these courts
30. See Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357, 359 (7th Cir. 1968). The
original statute gave the EEOC no enforcement powers through the adjudicatory process.
It merely allowed the EEOC to investigate charges and attempt to gain compliance by in-
formal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Enforcement of the rights of
aggrieved parties resided exclusively in either the individual or the Justice Department.
Id.
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976): "If the Commission determines after such in-
vestigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commis-
sion shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by infor-
mal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion." Id.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1976).
33. See id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
34. See EEOC v. Rexall Drug Co., 9 Empl.Prac. Dec. 9936 (E.D. Mo. 1974) (EEOC
action dismissed; court observed in dictum that the filing of a private action by an ag-
grieved party during the statutory period would preclude the EEOC from subsequently
filing its own action); EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 380 F. Supp. 1106 (W.D. Tenn. 1974),
rev'd and remanded, 511 F.2d 1352 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975) (EEOC ac-
tion dismissed, by estoppel, when pursued after the aggrieved parties brought individual
suits and signed agreements amounting to waivers of those claims, in settlement thereof);
EEOC v. Union Oil Co., 369 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (EEOC action dismissed; EEOC
loses its power to sue upon the filing of a private action involving the same charge);
EEOC v. Cronin, 370 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (EEOC action dismissed; prior filing and
prosecution of a private class action pursuant to a "right-to-sue" notice precludes later fil-
ing of a duplicitous action by the EEOC).
35. See, e.g., EEOC v. McLean Trucking Co., 525 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1975); EEOC v.
Huttig Sash & Door Co., 511 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Eagle Iron Works, 367 F.
Supp. 817 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
36. A Joint Conference Committee is formed to resolve the differences between the
House version and the Senate version of pending legislation. The Joint Conference ver-
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reasoned that a subsequent EEOC claim is not repititious because it
encompasses allegations and relief extending beyond that sought in the
private action.37
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, following
the second approach, has interpreted Title VII to allow subsequent
EEOC actions, and has handled duplicity problems by consolidating the
actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a).8 However, this ap-
proach is unavailable if, as in Jones, the first action has already been
finally resolved.
Courts following the third approach have relegated the party bring-
ing the second action to his right of intervention in the prior suit. The
first decision clearly restricting subsequent action to intervention was
EEOC v. Missouri-Pacific Railroad,39 wherein the EEOC was limited to
permissive intervention in the private suit under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(b) Title VII allows the EEOC permissive intervention in
any private action because Title VII cases are of general public impor-
tance, and the EEOC's intervention guarantees that the broader public
interest in eliminating the discriminatory practice will be enforced.41
The EEOC's ability to intervene is permissive because it can represent
its interest in any private action and a determination in one action
sion is then reported to the House and the Senate for final passage. The Joint Conference
Committee, in its section-by-section analysis of Title VII noted that Title VII claims in-
volve the vindication of a major public interest. See 118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972).
'37. See EEOC v. McLean Trucking Co., 525 F.2d at 1010-11 (EEOC was not preclud-
ed from maintaining a separate action after the individual complainant's action was
dismissed without prejudice in connection with a compromise settlement between the
complainant and his employer); EEOC v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 511 F.2d at 454 (where
a charging party's suit had been terminated, the EEOC was permitted to bring its own
suit based upon the same charge); EEOC v. Eagle Iron Works, 367 F. Supp. at 821-22
(where a charging party's suit had been dismissed, the EEOC was permitted to bring its
own suit based upon the same charge).
38. See EEOC v. North Hills Passavant Hosp., 544 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1976). FED. R.
Civ. P. 42(a) provides:
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the
actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders con-
cerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
Id.
39. 493 F.2d 71, 75 (8th Cir. 1974). In dictum, the Missouri-Pacific court mentioned
that intervention of right was the appropriate procedure by which a private individual
could pursue an action subsequent to the filing of an EEOC action. Id.
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b) provides for permissive intervention as follows: "Upon time-
ly application anyone shall be permitted to intervene ... (2) when an applicant's claim or
defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common .... " Id
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976) provides: "Upon timely application, the court may,
in its discretion, permit the Commission . . . to intervene in such civil action upon cer-
tification that the case is of general public importance." Id.
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does not bind the EEOC in subsequent actions.42 Following Missouri-
Pacific, courts43 have applied this approach to subsequent private ac-
tions, holding that when the EEOC files the prior action," an in-
dividual's only recourse is his intervention of right in the EEOC action
as provided in Title VII45 and in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a).6
A private litigant's right to intervene is absolute because his interests
are before the court in only one EEOC action. Thus, he must intervene
or be bound by the outcome of that action.4"
Although Jones is in line with this trend,48 it is distinguishable from
these cases because in Jones the EEOC action was concluded prior to
the commencement of the individual action.49 The EEOC action was
dismissed 'because of the EEOC's dilatory conduct," thus, there was
never in fact a trial on the merits. 1 Allowing Jones to proceed with his
individual action would be the first judicial consideration of the alleged
discrimination and thus would present no duplicity. However, because
the prior judgment was on the merits for purposes of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(b),52 the court was able to rest its dismissal of
Jones' action upon the doctrine of res judicata.3
42. See note 40 supra.
43. See, e.g., McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. 1977); Crump v.
Wagner Elec. Corp., 369 F. Supp. 637 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
44. Under the statute, the EEOC is given exclusive authority to commence an action
during the first 180 days following the filing of a charge by an aggrieved party. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976) states: "The person or persons aggrieved shall have
a right to intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission .... " Id.
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) provides for intervention of right as follows:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action...
(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that in-
terest ....
Id.
47. See id.
48. The majority of the circuits hold that the party bringing the subsequent action is
limited to intervention in the prior action. See, e.g., Johnson v. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper
Co., 558 F.2d 841 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977); McClain v. Wagner Elec.
Corp., 550 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. 1977); EEOC v. Continental Oil Co., 548 F.2d 884 (10th Cir.
1977); EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1976), affd, 432 U.S. 355
(1977); EEOC v. Missouri-Pac. Ry. Co., 493 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1974); Crump v. Wagner Elec.
Corp., 369 F. Supp. 637 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
49. The EEOC action was concluded on December 6, 1976. 426 F. Supp. at 785. Jones'
individual action was commenced on October 4, 1977. See Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., No.
CA 4-77-137 (N.D. Tex., filed May 23, 1977).
50. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
51. See note 18 and text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
52. See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
53. 614 F.2d at 1390.
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Historically, the doctrine of res judicata has been a "principle of
peace,"' striving to give effect to final judgments by binding all par-
ties and their privies to the determination, thus putting a resolute end
to the litigation.55 Although Jones was not a party to the initial EEOC
suit, his interests were theoretically represented by the EEOC6 giving
Jones privity in the action and the decision. Failing to intervene in
that action," Jones allowed judgment to pass, binding himself to that
judgment and precluding his subsequent private action." However, the
ineptness with which the EEOC handled Jones' charges raises the
question of whether he was in fact represented.
All examination of the checks and balances in the statutory scheme
of Title VII reveals that a portion of the responsibility for this lack of
representation must rest with Jones himself. The statutory scheme of
Title VII was designed to guarantee individual rights. The statute
prescribes a 180-day period immediately following the filing of
discrimination charges wherein the EEOC has the exclusive authority
to maintain an action on the individual's behalf.59 This allows the EEOC
to investigate the charge thoroughly and attempt conciliation before
any legal action may be commenced. Once conciliation fails, the EEOC
has authority to maintain an action on the charge." Title VII also pro-
vides to individuals the right to intervene in EEOC actions.6' This
right is a built-in protective device of the private interest. By exercis-
ing his right of absolute intervention, the individual can insure that he
54. Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 516 F.2d 103, 109 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting
Bennet v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 1940)). See also Seaboard Coast Line
R.R. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 409 F.2d 879, 881 (5th Cir. 1969); Opelousas-St. Landry Sec. Co. v.
United States, 66 F.2d 41, 44 (5th Cir. 1933).
55. The Supreme Court has stated that a "right, question or fact" distinctly put in
issue and directly determined by a court acting within its jurisdiction cannot be disputed
in a subsequent suit by the same parties. Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1,
48 (1897). See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1931)
("Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who have contested
an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be
considered forever settled between the parties"). Id See also Stevenson v. International
Paper Co., 516 F.2d at 109; Bennet v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 1940).
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
57. 614 F.2d at 1390.
58. Id at 1389-90. Cf Truvillion v. King's Daughters Hosp., 614 F.2d 520 (5th Cir.
1980) (EEOC dismissal for failure to meet procedural prerequisites to suit, characterized
as jurisdictional, did not bar the individual's subsequent action). See notes 21-24 and ac-
companying text supra.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(fX1) (1976).
60. Id § 2000e-5(a).
61. Id § 2000e-5(f)(1). This right is also provided by FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). See note 46
supra.
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will be heard by the court and can also request additional relief, should
he consider the EEOC prayer for relief unsatisfactory.
Additionally, the statute reserves the private right of action as a
final check against EEOC inaction and delay.2 If the EEOC finds no
merit in the discrimination charge or if it fails to file an action against
the alleged discriminator within 180 days, they must so notify the in-
dividual who may then maintain a private action. 3
This statutory scheme may justify what, at first glance, appears to
be a harsh decision. After the EEOC failed to bring an action within
the statutory period of 180 days, Jones failed to exercise his right to
maintain a private action. He also failed to exercise his right to intervene
in the subsequent EEOC action. Failing to intervene, he allowed judg-
ment to pass in the EEOC action, thereby binding himself as their
representee.
The resulting prejudice to the defendant of allowing Jones to pro-
ceed with his action provides an additional justification for the Jones
decision. The statutory scheme is silent as to the time limitation within
which the EEOC must proceed to redress the individual's alleged
damages. The Supreme Court has held that when Congress has created
a cause of action and has not specified a period of time within which it
may be asserted, the state statute of limitations should apply." How-
ever, in Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC5 the Supreme Court
held that EEOC enforcement actions are not subject to state statutes
of limitations because such application would be inconsistent with the
federal statute's underlying policies. 6 The necessary investigation of
charges and conciliation efforts prerequisite to any litigation lead to
lengthy delays and backlogs in the EEOC caseload. Thus, it would be
inequitable to bind the EEOC to a state statute of limitation which
fails to consider these circumstances. In addition, the EEOC assumed
substantial additional enforcement responsibility with the 1972 amend-
ment to Title VII. Thus, because of the recognized caseload burden of
the EEOC, an administrative agency with both a shortage of staff and
an insufficiency of funds, the EEOC can avoid the governing statute of
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). Individuals who have filed charges alleging
employment discrimination with the EEOC can sue in their own names if the EEOC
dismisses the charge(s) or if within 180 days from filing the charge the EEOC fails to bring
suit or enter into a conciliation agreement to which the aggrieved individual is a party. Id
63. See id.
64. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179-82 (1976) (absent a federal statute
of limitations governing civil rights actions the court applied the state statute of limita-
tions governing personal injuries); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) (the
silence of Congress as to a time limitation has been interpreted to mean that the federal
court is to adopt the local statute of limitations).
65. 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
66. Id at 366-72.
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limitations." However, because a defendant may be handicapped in
making his defense due to inordinate EEOC delay in filing the action,
the Occidental Court held that the federal courts have the power to
provide appropriate relief."
The Jones court applied the Administrative Procedure Act in con-
sidering the timeliness of the EEOC action. 9 Under this Act, unreason-
able agency delay and prejudice to the defendant result in dismissal of
the action. 0 The Jones court's application of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act is in accord with the Supreme Court decision in Occidental
wherein the Court held that relief may be provided where the defend-
ant is prejudiced by inordinate EEOC delay.71 The Jones court dis-
missed the action in consideration of this showing of prejudice by Bell
Helicopter.2
In spite of the provisions in Title VII for individual participation,
private claimants may feel safe in relying upon the EEOC to pursue
their claims. Although it appears unfair to punish Jones for
bureaucratic delays of the EEOC, it is even more unjust to prejudice
Bell Helicopter for the combined delays of Jones and the EEOC by
allowing a nine-year-old claim to be pursued against it. Nevertheless,
the result in Jones thwarts the purposes of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 because potential discrimination remains unexamined. Although
the case is technically correct in its application of the statute and the
doctrine of res judicata, the result does not provide relief for the ag-
grieved individual. For this reason, application of Jones should be con-
fined to the facts of the case.
John R. O'Keefe
67. Id. at 369-71.
68. Id. at 373.
69. 614 F.2d at 1390. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 706(1), (2) (1976). An alternate means by
which the court could have dismissed Jones' case was to invoke the applicable statute of
limitations. The Texas statute of limitations for personal injuries is two years. TEx. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN., art. 5526 (Vernon Supp. 1980). The Fifth Circuit has applied this statute
of limitations in Title VII cases in the past. Dupree v. Hutchins Bros., 521 F.2d 236 (5th
Cir. 1975). See also Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1378-79 (5th
Cir. 1974). However, it is unclear whether Occidental can be applied to individuals pursu-
ing Title VII claims to save them from the governing statute of limitations. See notes
64-68 and accompanying text supra.
70. See Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745, 747 (5th Cir. 1972). The factors
resulting in dismissal under the Administrative Procedure Act were set out in dictum in
EEOC v. Exchange Security Bank, 529 F.2d 1214, 1216 (5th Cir. 1976), and Chromcraft
Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d at 747, and were upheld in EEOC v. Moore Group, 416 F. Supp.
1002, 1004 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
71. See 432 U.S. at 373.
72. 614 F.2d at 1390.
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